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Abstract
The“mind-brain supervenience” conjecture suggests that all mental properties are derived from the physical proper-
ties of the brain. To address the question of whether the mind supervenes on the brain, we frame a supervenience
hypothesis in rigorous statistical terms. Specifically, we propose a modified version of supervenience (called ε-
supervenience) that is amenable to experimental investigation and statistical analysis. To illustrate this approach, we
perform a thought experiment that illustrates how the probabilistic theory of pattern recognition can be used to make a
one-sided determination of ε-supervenience. The physical property of the brain employed in this analysis is the graph
describing brain connectivity (i.e., the brain-graph or connectome). ε-supervenience allows us to determine whether a
particular mental property can be inferred from one’s connectome to within any given positive misclassification rate,
regardless of the relationship between the two. This may provide motivation for cross-disciplinary research between
neuroscientists and statisticians.
Introduction
Questions and assumptions about mind-brain supervenience go back at least as far as Plato’s dialogues in circa 400
BCE [1]. While there are many different notions of supervenience, we find Davidson’s canonical description particu-
larly illustrative [2]:
[mind-brain] supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical
respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without
altering in some physical respect.
This philosophical conjecture has potentially widespread implications. For example, neural network theory and ar-
tificial intelligence often implicitly assume a local version mind-brain supervenience [3, 4]. Cognitive neuroscience
similarly seems to operate under such assumptions [5]. Philosophers continue to debate and refine notions of su-
pervenience [6]. Yet, to date, relatively scant attention has been paid to what might be empirically learned about
supervenience.
In this work we attempt to bridge the gap between philosophical conjecture and empirical investigations by casting
supervenience in a probabilistic framework amenable to hypothesis testing. We then use the probabilistic theory of
pattern recognition to determine the limits of what one can and cannot learn about supervenience through data analysis.
Results
Statistical supervenience: a definition
LetM = {m1,m2, . . .} be the space of all possible minds and let B = {b1, b2, . . .} be the set of all possible brains.M
includes a mind for each possible collection of thoughts, memories, beliefs, etc. B includes a brain for each possible
position and momentum of all subatomic particles within the skull. Given these definitions, Davidson’s conjecture may
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be concisely and formally stated thusly: m 6= m′ =⇒ b 6= b′, where (m, b), (m′, b′) ∈M×B are mind-brain pairs.
This mind-brain supervenience relation does not imply an injective relation, a causal relation, or an identity relation
(see Appendix for more details and some examples). To facilitate both statistical analysis and empirical investigation,
we convert this supervenience relation from a logical to a probabilistic relation.
Let FMB indicate a joint distribution of minds and brains. Statistical supervenience can then be defined as follows:
Definition 1. M is said to statistically supervene on B for distribution F = FMB , denotedM S∼F B, if and only if
P[m 6= m′|b = b′] = 0, or equivalently P[m = m′|b = b′] = 1.
Statistical supervenience is therefore a probabilistic relation on sets (which could be considered a generalization of
correlation; see Appendix for details).
Statistical supervenience is equivalent to perfect classification accuracy
If minds statistically supervene on brains, then if two minds differ, there must be some brain-based difference to
account for the mental difference. This means that there must exist a deterministic function g∗ mapping each brain
to its supervening mind. One could therefore, in principle, know this function. When the space of all possible minds
is finite—that is, |M| < ∞—any function g : B → M mapping from minds to brains is called a classifier. Define
misclassification rate, the probability that g misclassifies b under distribution F = FMB , as
LF (g) = P[g(B) 6=M ] =
∑
(m,b)∈M×B
I{g(b) 6= m}P[B = b,M = m], (1)
where I{·} denotes the indicator function taking value unity whenever its argument is true and zero otherwise. The
Bayes optimal classifier g∗ minimizes LF (g) over all classifiers: g∗ = argming LF (g). The Bayes error, or Bayes
risk, L∗ = LF (g∗), is the minimum possible misclassification rate.
The primary result of casting supervenience in a statistical framework is the below theorem, which follows imme-
diately from Definition 1 and Eq. (1):
Theorem 1. M S∼F B ⇔ L∗ = 0.
The above argument shows (for the first time to our knowledge) that statistical supervenience and zero Bayes error
are equivalent. Statistical supervenience can therefore be thought of as a constraint on the possible distributions on
minds and brains. Specifically, let F indicate the set of all possible joint distributions on minds and brains, and let
Fs = {FMB ∈ F : L∗ = 0} be the subset of distributions for which supervenience holds. Theorem 1 implies that
Fs $ F . Mind-brain supervenience is therefore an extremely restrictive assumption about the possible relationships
between minds and brains. It seems that such a restrictive assumption begs for empirical evaluation, vis-a´-vis, for
instance, a hypothesis test.
The non-existence of a viable statistical test for supervenience
The above theorem implies that if we desire to know whether minds supervene on brains, we can check whether
L∗ = 0. Unfortunately, L∗ is typically unknown. Fortunately, we can approximate L∗ using training data.
Assume that training data Tn = {(M1, B1), . . . , (Mn, Bn)} are each sampled identically and independently (iid)
from the true (but unknown) joint distribution F = FMB . Let gn be a classifier induced by the training data, gn :
B × (M×B)n 7→ M. The misclassification rate of such a classifier is given by
LF (gn) =
∑
(m,b)∈M×B
I{gn(b; Tn) 6= m}P[B = b,M = m], (2)
which is a random variable due to the dependence on a randomly sampled training set Tn. Calculating the ex-
pected misclassification rate E[LF (gn)] is often intractable in practice because it requires a sum over all possi-
ble training sets. Instead, expected misclassification rate can be approximated by “hold-out” error. Let Hn′ =
{(Mn+1, Bn+1), . . . , (Mn+n′ , Bn+n′)} be a set of n′ hold-out samples, each sampled iid from FMB . The hold-out
approximation to the misclassification rate is given by
L̂n
′
F (gn) =
∑
(Mi,Bi)∈Hn′
I{gn(Bi; Tn) 6=Mi} ≈ E[LF (gn)] ≥ L∗. (3)
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By definition of g∗, the expectation of L̂n
′
F (gn) (with respect to both Tn andHn′) is greater than or equal to L∗ for any
gn and all n. Thus, we can construct a hypothesis test for L∗ using the surrogate L̂n
′
F (gn).
A statistical test proceeds by specifying the allowable Type I error rate α > 0 and then calculating a test statistic.
The p-value—the probability of rejecting the least favorable null hypothesis (the simple hypothesis within the poten-
tially composite null which is closest to the boundary with the alternative hypothesis)—is the probability of observing
a result at least as extreme as the observed. In other words, the p-value is the cumulative distribution function of the
test statistic evaluated at the observed test statistic with parameter given by the least favorable null distribution. We
reject if the p-value is less than α. A test is consistent whenever its power (the probability of rejecting the null when
it is indeed false) goes to unity as n→∞ . For any statistical test, if the p-value converges in distribution to δ0 (point
mass at zero), then whenever α > 0, power goes to unity.
Based on the above considerations, we might consider the following hypothesis test: H0 : L∗ > 0 and HA : L∗ =
0; rejecting the null indicates that M S∼F B. Unfortunately, the alternative hypothesis lies on the boundary, so the
p-value is always equal to unity [7]. From this, Theorem 2 follows immediately:
Theorem 2. There does not exist a viable test ofM S∼F B.
In other words, we can never reject L∗ > 0 in favor of supervenience, no matter how much data we obtain.
Conditions for a consistent statistical test for ε-supervenience
To proceed, therefore, we introduce a relaxed notion of supervenience:
Definition 2. M is said to ε-supervene on B for distribution F = FMB , denotedM ε∼FB, if and only if L∗ < ε for
some ε > 0.
Given this relaxation, consider the problem of testing for ε-supervenience:
Hε0 : L
∗ ≥ ε
HεA : L
∗ < ε.
Let nˆ = n′L̂n
′
F (gn) be the test statistic. The distribution of nˆ is available under the least favorable null distribution.
For the above hypothesis test, the p-value is therefore the binomial cumulative distribution function with parameter
ε; that is, p-value = B(nˆ;n′, ε) =
∑
k∈[nˆ]0Binomial(k;n
′; ε), where [nˆ]0 = {0, 1, . . . , nˆ}. We reject whenever this
p-value is less than α; rejection implies that we are 100(1− α)% confident thatM ε∼FB.
For the above ε-supervenience statistical test, if gn → g∗ as n→∞, then L̂n′F (gn)→ L∗ as n, n′ →∞. Thus, if
L∗ < ε, power goes to unity. The definition of ε-supervenience therefore admits, for the first time to our knowledge,
a viable statistical test of supervenience, given a specified ε and α. Moreover, this test is consistent whenever gn
converges to the Bayes classifier g∗.
The existence and construction of a consistent statistical test for ε-supervenience
The above considerations indicate the existence of a consistent test for ε-supervenience whenever the classifier used
is consistent. To actually implement such a test, one must be able to (i) measure mind/brain pairs and (ii) have a
consistent classifier gn. Unfortunately, we do not know how to measure the entirety of one’s brain, much less one’s
mind. We therefore must restrict our interest to a mind/brain property pair. A mind (mental) property might be a
person’s intelligence, psychological state, current thought, gender identity, etc. A brain property might be the number
of cells in a person’s brain at some time t, or the collection of spike trains of all neurons in the brain during some
time period t to t′. Regardless of the details of the specifications of the mental property and the brain property, given
such specifications, one can assume a model, F . We desire a classifier gn that is guaranteed to be consistent, no
matter which of the possible distributions FMB ∈ F is the true distribution. A classifier with such a property is
called a universally consistent classifier. Below, under a very general mind-brain model F , we construct a universally
consistent classifier.
Gedankenexperiment 1. Let the physical property under consideration be brain connectivity structure, so b is a brain-
graph (“connectome”) with vertices representing neurons (or collections thereof) and edges representing synapses (or
3
Vogelstein JT, et al. Statistical Supervenience
collections thereof). Further let B, the brain observation space, be the collection of all graphs on a given finite number
of vertices, and letM, the mental property observation space, be finite. Now, imagine collecting very large amounts of
very accurate identically and independently sampled brain-graph data and associated mental property indicators from
FMB . A kn-nearest neighbor classifier using a Frobenius norm is universally consistent (see Methods for details).
The existence of a universally consistent classifier guarantees that eventually (in n, n′) we will be able to conclude
M ε∼FB for this mind-brain property pair, if indeed ε-supervenience holds. This logic holds for directed graphs or
multigraphs or hypergraphs with discrete edge weights and vertex attributes, as well as unlabeled graphs (see [8] for
details). Furthermore, the proof holds for other matrix norms (which might speed up convergence and hence reduce
the required n), and the regression scenario where |M| is infinite (again, see Methods for details).
Thus, under the conditions stated in the above Gedankenexperiment, universal consistency yields:
Theorem 3. M ε∼FB =⇒ β → 1 as n, n′ →∞.
Unfortunately, the rate of convergence of LF (gn) to LF (g∗) depends on the (unknown) distribution F = FMB
[9]. Furthermore, arbitrarily slow convergence theorems regarding the rate of convergence of LF (gn) to LF (g∗)
demonstrate that there is no universal n, n′ which will guarantee that the test has power greater than any specified
target β > α [10]. For this reason, the test outlined above can provide only a one-sided conclusion: if we reject we
can be 100(1− α)% confident thatM ε∼FB holds, but we can never be confident in its negation; rather, it may be the
case that the evidence in favor ofM ε∼FB is insufficient because we simply have not yet collected enough data. This
leads immediately to the following theorem:
Theorem 4. For any target power βmin > α, there is no universal n, n′ that guarantees β ≥ βmin.
Therefore, even ε-supervenience does not satisfy Popper’s falsifiability criterion [11].
The feasibility of a consistent statistical test for ε-supervenience
Theorem 3 demonstrates the availability of a consistent test under certain restrictions. Theorem 4, however, demon-
strates that convergence rates might be unbearably slow. We therefore provide an illustrative example of the feasibility
of such a test on synthetic data.
Caenorhabditis elegans is a species whose nervous system is believed to consist of the same 279 labeled neurons
for each organism [12]. Moreover, these animals exhibit a rich behavioral repertoire that seemingly depends on circuit
properties [13]. These findings motivate the use of C. elegans for a synthetic data analysis [14]. Conducting such
an experiment requires specifying a joint distribution FMB over brain-graphs and behaviors. The joint distribution
decomposes into the product of a class-conditional distribution (likelihood) and a prior, FMB = FB|MFM . The prior
specifies the probability of any particular organism exhibiting the behavior. The class-conditional distribution specifies
the brain-graph distribution given that the organism does (or does not) exhibit the behavior.
Let Auv be the number of chemical synapses between neuron u and neuron v according to [15]. Then, let S be the
set of edges deemed responsible for odor-evoked behavior according to [16]. If odor-evoked behavior is supervenient
on this signal subgraph S, then the distribution of edges in S must differ between the two classes of odor evoked
behavior [17]. Let Euv|j denote the expected number of edges from vertex v to vertex u in class j. For class m0, let
Euv|0 = Auv + η, where η = 0.05 is a small noise parameter (it is believed that the C. elegans connectome is similar
across organisms [12]). For class m1, let Euv|1 = Auv + zuv , where the signal parameter zuv = η for all edges not
in S, and zuv is uniformly sampled from [−5, 5] for all edges within S . For both classes, let each edge be Poisson
distributed, FAuv|M=mj= Poisson(Euv|j).
We consider kn-nearest neighbor classification of labeled multigraphs (directed, with loops) on 279 vertices, under
Frobenius norm. The kn-nearest neighbor classifier used here satisfies kn →∞ as n→∞ and kn/n→ 0 as n→∞,
ensuring universal consistency. (Better classifiers can be constructed for the joint distributionFMB used here; however,
we demand universal consistency.) Figure 1 shows that for this simulation, rejecting (ε = 0.1)-supervenience at
α = 0.01 requires only a few hundred training samples.
Importantly, conducting this experiment in actu is not beyond current technological limitations. 3D superresolution
imaging [18] combined with neurite tracing algorithms [19, 20, 21] allow the collection of a C. elegans brain-graph
within a day. Genetic manipulations, laser ablations, and training paradigms can each be used to obtain a non-wild type
population for use as M = m1 [13], and the class of each organism (m0 vs. m1) can also be determined automatically
[22].
4
Vogelstein JT, et al. Statistical Supervenience
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
nj
L^
Figure 1: C. elegans graph classification simulation results. The estimated hold-out misclassification rate L̂n
′
F (gn)
(with n′ = 1000 testing samples) is plotted as a function of class-conditional training sample size nj = n/2, suggest-
ing that for ε = 0.1we can determine thatM ε∼FB holds with 99% confidence with just a few hundred training samples
generated from FMB . Each dot depicts L̂n
′
F (gn) for some n; standard errors are (L̂
n′
F (gn)(1 − L̂n
′
F (gn))/n
′)1/2. For
example, at nj = 180 we have kn = b
√
8nc = 53 (where b·c indicates the floor operator), L̂n′F (gn) = 0.057, and
standard error less than 0.01. We reject H0.10 : L
∗ ≥ 0.1 at α = 0.01. Note that L∗ ≈ 0 for this simulation.
Discussion
This work makes the following contributions. First, we define statistical supervenience based on Davidson’s canonical
statement (Definition 1). This definition makes it apparent that supervenience implies the possibility of perfect classi-
fication (Theorem 1). We then prove that there is no viable test against supervenience, so one can never reject a null
hypothesis in favor of supervenience, regardless of the amount of data (Theorem 2). This motivates the introduction of
a relaxed notion called ε-supervenience (Definition 2), against which consistent statistical tests are readily available.
Under a very general brain-graph/mental property model (Gedankenexperiment 1), a consistent statistical test against
ε-supervenience is always available no matter the true distribution FMB (Theorem 3). In other words, the proposed test
is guaranteed to reject the null whenever the null is false, given sufficient data, for any possible distribution governing
mental property/brain property pairs.
Alas, arbitrary slow convergence theorems demonstrate that there is no universal n, n′ for which convergence
is guaranteed (Theorem 4). Thus, a failure to reject is ambiguous: even if the data satisfy the above assumptions,
the failure to reject may be due to either (i) an insufficient amount of data or (ii) M may not be ε-supervenient on
B. Moreover, the data will not, in general, satisfy the above assumptions. In addition to dependence (because each
human does not exist in a vacuum), the mental property measurements will often be “noisy” (for example, accurately
diagnosing psychiatric disorders is a sticky wicket [23]). Nonetheless, synthetic data analysis suggests that under
somewhat realistic assumptions, convergence obtains with an amount of data one might conceivably collect (Figure 1
and ensuing discussion).
Thus, given measurements of mental and brain properties that we believe reflect the properties of interest, and given
a sufficient amount of data satisfying the independent and identically sampled assumption, a rejection of Hε0 : L
∗ ≥ ε
in favor of M ε∼FB entails that we are 100(1 − a)% confident that the mental property under investigation is ε-
supervenient on the brain property under investigation. Unfortunately, failure to reject is more ambiguous.
Interestingly, much of contemporary research in neuroscience and cognitive science could be cast as mind-brain
supervenience investigations. Specifically, searches for “engrams” of memory traces [24] or “neural correlates” of
5
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various behaviors or mental properties (for example, consciousness [25]), may be more aptly called searches for the
“neural supervenia” of such properties. Letting the brain property be a brain-graph is perhaps especially pertinent in
light of the advent of “connectomics” [26, 27], a field devoted to estimating whole organism brain-graphs and relating
them to function. Testing supervenience of various mental properties on these brain-graphs will perhaps therefore
become increasingly compelling; the framework developed herein could be fundamental to these investigations. For
example, questions about whether connectivity structure alone is sufficient to explain a particular mental property is
one possible mind-brain ε-supervenience investigation. The above synthetic data analysis demonstrates the feasibil-
ity of ε-supervenience on small brain-graphs. Similar supervenience tests on larger animals (such as humans) will
potentially benefit from either higher-throughput imaging modalities [28, 29], more coarse brain-graphs [30, 31], or
both.
Methods
The 1-nearest neighbor (1-NN) classifier works as follows. Compute the distance between the test brain b and all n
training brains, di = d(b, bi) for all i ∈ [n], where [n] = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, sort these distances, d(1) < d(2) <
. . . < d(n), and consider their corresponding minds, m(1),m(2), . . . ,m(n), where parenthetical indices indicate rank
order among {di}i∈[n]. The 1-NN algorithm predicts that the unobserved mind is of the same class as the closest
brain’s class: mˆ = m(1). The kn nearest neighbor is a straightforward generalization of this approach. It says
that the test mind is in the same class as whichever class is the plurality class among the kn nearest neighbors,
mˆ = argmaxm′ I{
∑kn
i=1m(i) = m
′}. Given a particular choice of kn (the number of nearest neighbors to consider)
and a choice of d(·, ·) (the distance metric used to compare the test datum and training data), one has a relatively
simple and intuitive algorithm.
Let gn be the kn nearest neighbor (knNN) classifier when there are n training samples. A collection of such
classifiers {gn}, with kn increasing with n, is called a classifier sequence. A universally consistent classifier sequence
is any classifier sequence that is guaranteed to converge to the Bayes optimal classifier regardless of the true distribution
from which the data were sampled; that is, a universally consistent classifier sequence satisfies LF (gn)→ LF (g∗) as
n→∞ for all FMB . In the main text, we refer to the whole sequence as a classifier.
The knNN classifier is consistent if (i) kn →∞ as n→∞ and (ii) kn/n→ 0 as n→∞ [32]. In Stone’s original
proof [32], b was assumed to be a q-dimensional vector, and the L2 norm (d(b, b′) =
∑q
j=1(bj−b′j)2, where j indexes
elements of the q-dimensional vector) was shown to satisfy the constraints on a distance metric for this collection of
classifiers to be universally consistent. Later, others extended these results to apply to any Lp norm [9]. When brain-
graphs are represented by their adjacency matrices, one can stack the columns of the adjacency matrices, effectively
embedding graphs into a vector space, in which case Stone’s theorem applies. Stone’s original proof also applied to
the scenario when |M| was infinite, resulting in a universally consistent regression algorithm as well.
Note that the above extension of Stone’s original theorem to the graph domain implicitly assumed that vertices
were labeled, such that elements of the adjacency matrices could easily be compared across graphs. In theory, when
vertices are unlabeled, one could first map each graph to a quotient space invariant to isomorphisms, and then proceed
as before. Unfortunately, there is no known polynomial time complexity algorithm for graph isomorphism [33], so in
practice, dealing with unlabeled vertices will likely be computationally challenging [8].
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Appendix
In this appendix we compare supervenience to several other relations on sets (see Figure 2).
First, a supervenient relation does not imply an injective relation. An injective relation is any relation that preserves
distinctness. Thus if minds are injective on brains, then b 6= b′ =⇒ m 6= m′ (note that the directionality of the
implication has been switched relative to supervenience). However, it might be the case that a brain could change
without the mind changing. Consider the case that a single subatomic particle shifts its position by a Plank length,
changing brain state from b to b′. It is possible (likely?) that the mental state supervening on brain state b remains m,
even after b changes to b′. In such a scenario, the mind might still supervene on the brain, but the relation from brains
to minds is not injective. This argument also shows that supervenience is not necessarily a symmetric relation. Minds
supervening on brains does not imply that brains supervene on minds.
Second, supervenience does not imply causality. For instance, consider an analogy where M and B correspond to
two coins being flipped, each possibly landing on heads or tails. Further assume that every time one lands on heads so
does the other, and every time one lands on tails, so do the other. This implies that M supervenes on B, but assumes
nothing about whether M causes B, or B causes M , or some exogenous force causes both.
Third, supervenience does not imply identity. The above example with the two coins demonstrates this, as the two
coins are not the same thing, even if one has perfect information about the other.
What supervenience does imply, however, is the following. Imagine finding two unequal minds. IfM S∼F B, then
the brains on which those two minds supervene must be different. In other words, there cannot be two unequal minds,
either of which could supervene on a single brain. Figure 2 shows several possible relations between the sets of minds
and brains.
Note that statistical supervenience is distinct from statistical correlation. Statistical correlation between brain
states and mental states is defined as ρMB = E[(B − µB)(M − µM )]/(σBσM ), where µX and σX are the mean
and variance of X , and E[X] is the expected value of X . If ρMB = 1, then both M S∼F B and B S∼FM. Thus,
perfect correlation implies supervenience, but supervenience does not imply correlation. In fact, supervenience may
be thought of as a generalization of correlation which incorporates directionality, can be applied to arbitrary valued
random variables (such as mental or brain properties), can depend on any moment of a distribution (not just the first
two).
b1
b2
b3
m1
m2
m3
b1
b2
b3
m1
m2
b1
b2
b3
m1
m2
m3
(A) (B) (C)
Figure 2: Possible relations between minds and brains. (A) Minds supervene on brains, and it so happens that there is
a bijective relation from brains to minds. (B) Minds supervene on brains, and it so happens that there is a surjective
(a.k.a., onto) relation from brains to minds, but not a bijective one. (C) Minds are not supervenient on brains, because
two different minds supervene on the same brain.
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